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In the last half of the twentieth century,
several widely publicized acute episodes of
lethal smogs spurred public understanding of
the hazards of air pollution. One of the earli-
est such events occurred from 1 December to
5 December 1930 in the Meuse Valley in
Belgium (1). Stable atmospheric conditions
and industrial pollution from steel mills, coke
ovens, foundries, and smelters in Liege,
Belgium, contributed to the accumulation of
air pollutants including sulfur dioxide (SO2),
sulfuric acid mists, and ﬂuoride gases. In the
last 2 days of the event, more than 60 persons
died, which was more than 10 times the
normal mortality rate (2).
The first publicly recognized extreme air
pollution episode in the United States took
place in Donora, a small town in southwest-
ern Pennsylvania. From 27 October to 30
October 1948, an intense, anticyclonic
meteorologic inversion settled on the valley
town, fueled by pollution from metal works,
coal-ﬁred home and industrial facilities, coke
ovens, a zinc retort refinery, and iron and
steel industries. Seventeen people died on
Saturday, 30 October, and three more died
within the week. The death rate was more
than 6 times the norm for the Donora and
Webster Hollow area, which had a popula-
tion of about 14,000. Pollution was so severe
that local funeral homes did not have enough
cofﬁns and many residents evacuated (3,4).
Long known for its foggy weather and
coal-burning homes, power plants, and fac-
tories, London, England, experienced a dense
smog from 5 December to 9 December
1952. According to official government
reports, this lethal fog resulted in about
3,000 more deaths than normal during the
first 3 weeks of December 1952. With a
death rate more than 3 times the norm for
this period (5), the London fog of 1952 is
widely regarded as a catalyst for the study of
air pollution epidemiology.
The ofﬁcial report on the London episode
by the Ministry of Health noted morbidity
and mortality remained elevated from
December 1952 until March 1953 in the
region of Greater London. However, the
report attributed these increased rates to an
influenza epidemic, while recognizing some
deaths may have been due to lingering effects
from the fog (5). In 1954 Wilkins noted this
prolonged increase in mortality and suggested
it could be related to air pollution. He also
indicated the December 1952 fog might have
impaired resistance to illness, causing higher
mortality in subsequent months (6). No
follow-up work was done to clarify this idea
at the time, and official estimates attributed
lingering increased rates of illness and death
to inﬂuenza. 
At the time they occurred, each of these
three cases was prominent in the news, signal-
ing in very public ways that severe air pollu-
tion could be fatal in a relatively short time.
Those events spawned public health research
into various impacts of air pollution and the
search for mechanisms by which smog might
be linked with altered death rates. 
Immediate investigations in Donora,
London, and Liege confirmed associations
between short-term reductions in air quality
and increased mortality during acute episodes
(7). However, no studies were produced
within the first several years that addressed
persisting public health consequences after
each of these episodes. More recently,
Schwartz compared the daily mortality and
total particulate matter (PM) concentrations
for 2–5 December, the 4-day period preced-
ing the episode, to those during the 6–9
December episode and found an increased rel-
ative risk (RR) of mortality of 1.06 per 100
µg/m3 increase in total suspended matter
(TSM) (8).
Since these events, public health
researchers have provided extensive documen-
tation that acutely elevated exposures do not
cause only acutely evident public health
effects. These exposures also contribute to
chronic health problems (9). By extending the
period of analysis and looking at novel direct
and indirect indicators of respiratory morbid-
ity and mortality for the 3 months after the
1952 London fog, this article establishes that
the original assessment was incomplete.
Methods
In an effort to clarify the connections between
acute air pollution during the London smog
and both acute and chronic health effects
linked with this episode, we assembled origi-
nal information and conducted regression
analyses of various direct and indirect indica-
tors of respiratory morbidity and mortality
and air pollution, with appropriate lag peri-
ods. We included the following:
• Analysis of changes in the RR of daily
mortality and measures of SO2 and smoke
or particles (TSM) for the days surround-
ing and including the fog in December
1952, including consideration of mini-
mum and maximum temperature and
relative humidity
• Analysis of weekly mortality and air pol-
lution data including several weeks before
and after the episode from October 1952
through March 1953 and corresponding
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weeks from 1951 and 1952, and
consideration of temperature, season,
autocorrelation of weekly mortality, and
exclusion of the week of the severe fog
• Analysis of indirect indicators of morbidity:
insurance claims, hospital admissions, and
notifications of pneumonia from
November 1952 to January 1953 with
comparisons for previous years
• Assessment of the potential role of
inﬂuenza in accounting for elevated rates
of morbidity and mortality during the 3
months after the lethal smog episode and
calculation of the excess deaths due to
the smog
• Examination of levels of key pollutants
during the lethal fog compared to
modern-day standards and to levels
encountered currently in some rapidly
developing regions.
Data Sources and Limitations
Air pollutant concentrations used in analysis
are averages of measurements from 12 moni-
tors in Greater London. Only TSM and SO2
air pollutant concentrations were routinely
measured at the time. The two pollutants
were highly correlated. In much of the analy-
sis, SO2 is used as a surrogate for air pollution.
Daily temperature estimates are averages of
measurements at two locations. Daily relative
humidity is an average of measurements taken
3 times a day at the same two locations (5).
Weekly mortality estimates represent the
number of deaths registered with the British
General Register Ofﬁce Statistics. Deaths typ-
ically were registered within 2–3 days of their
occurrence (5).
Weekly insurance claims are based on
claims for new illnesses received by the
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
(5). Hospital admissions information is based
on reports from four metropolitan regional
hospital boards in Greater London (5).
Applications for emergency bed service refer
to applications to the Emergency Bed Service
Bureau (5,10). Pneumonia was a notifiable
disease in England; therefore, notiﬁcations of
pneumonia cases are available (5). Influenza
was not a notiﬁable disease, so the exact num-
ber of new cases is unknown, as is the case
fatality rate. Influenza incidence and case
fatality rate were estimated from observations
in general practice in the London area from
1949 to 1968 and from a vaccine study
conducted at this time (11,12). 
The major limitation of this research is
data availability. Some information was not
collected at the time, such as inﬂuenza mor-
tality and air pollutant concentrations for pol-
lutants other than TSM and SO2. This work
is limited to data readily available, which
results in different baseline years used for var-
ious outcomes. Some health indicators are
compared to those of the previous year, the
corresponding 1951–1952 time frame,
whereas a multiple-year comparison would be
preferable. This analysis assumes the
1951–1952 mortality data represent a typical
year, as there are no reports of inﬂuenza out-
breaks or severe fogs during that time (6,13).
Results
Acute Effects on Mortality
Daily air pollution concentrations of SO2 and
TSM and mortality from 2 December to 10
December 1952 are highly correlated (Table
1), as are daily mortality and SO2 and TSM
levels from the same and previous day in
Greater London and London Administrative
County (5).
Poisson modeling of mortality, tempera-
ture, and the previous day’s pollutant concen-
trations from 3 December to 10 December
1952 for Greater London indicates a signiﬁ-
cant association between pollutant levels and
death for the few days of data that are avail-
able. For a 0.10-ppm increase in the previous
day’s SO2 level, the estimated RR for daily
mortality is 1.19 (95% confidence interval
[CI] 1.12–1.27). Alternatively, the estimated
RR for a 100 µg/m3-ppm increase in the pre-
vious day’s TSM resulted in an estimated rel-
ative risk for mortality of 1.08 (95% CI
1.05–1.10). These results are not sensitive to
outlier data points. Removing the day of peak
pollution gives an SO2 RR of 1.21 (95% CI
1.12–1.30) and a TSM RR of 1.07
(1.05–1.11). As the two pollutants were
highly correlated (0.98), it is difficult to
separate their effects.
Backward regression analysis of daily
minimum temperature, maximum tempera-
ture, relative humidity, and the previous day’s
TSM and SO2 concentrations produced a
model including SO2 and maximum temper-
ature. The RR for a 0.10 increase in daily
SO2, adjusted for maximum temperature, is
1.27 (95% CI 1.17–1.38). No interaction
was apparent between SO2 and TSM or
between either pollutant and temperature.
Associations are even stronger when only the
Administrative County of London is consid-
ered. Table 2 provides RR for daily mortality.
Regression analysis of approximate weekly
mortality and air pollutant concentrations in
Greater London included time before and after
the severe event. Weekly estimates of mortality
from 11 October 1952 to 28 March 1953 are
significantly associated with the week’s SO2
concentration. SO2 is used rather than TSM
based on data availability and because the two
pollutants were highly correlated. For a 0.10-
ppm increase in weekly SO2, the RR for
weekly mortality is 1.35 (95% CI 1.08–1.68).
Note, however, if the week of the episode is
removed from analysis, the association remains
positive, although not significant (RR 1.21,
95% CI 0.83–1.76). When data from corre-
sponding weeks in 1951 and 1952 are also
considered, the RR becomes 1.38 (95% CI
1.18–1.60). Omitting the week of the severe
event in 1952 provides a positive and signiﬁ-
cant RR of 1.28 (95% CI 1.03–1.59).
Weekly mortality estimates are correlated
with mortality from the previous week (0.58
for the 1952/1953 data). Regression analysis
including a term for the previous week’s mor-
tality provides a similar but even more signiﬁ-
cant RR for a 0.10-ppm increase in SO2. The
estimated RR is 1.32 (95% CI 1.16–1.51).
When the corresponding 1951 and 1952
weeks also are considered, the RR is 1.25
(95% CI 1.15–1.37). These relationships
were not confounded by temperature. The
RR for a 0.10-ppm increase in the weekly
SO2 average was 1.26 (95% CI 1.14–1.39),
adjusted for weekly average temperature and
the previous week’s mortality.
To account for possible confounding by
season and varying underlying mortality, the
analysis was repeated with variables to indi-
cate month. This did not greatly affect the
results. The association remained significant
with a RR of 1.31 (95% CI 1.11–1.56),
adjusted for the previous week’s mortality.
When the corresponding 1951 and 1952
weeks are included, the RR becomes 1.25
(95% CI 1.13–1.38).
Table 1. Correlations for daily mortality and air pollutant concentration.
SO2
Same day Previous day TSM
(2–10 December 1952) (3–10 December 1952) Same day Previous day
Mortality in Greater London 0.89 0.94 0.83 0.96
Mortality in London  0.89 0.93 0.83 0.95
Administrative County
Table 2. Relative risk for daily mortality and the previous day’s pollution levels.
Greater London London Administrative County
SO2 (0.10-ppm increase) 1.19 (1.12–1.27) 1.24 (1.14–1.35)
Adjusted for maximum temperature 1.27 (1.17–1.38) 1.34 (1.20–1.51)
TSM (100-µg/m3 increase) 1.08 (1.05–1.10) 1.10 (1.06–1.13)
Adjusted for maximum temperature 1.08 (1.06–1.10) 1.09 (1.07–1.12)
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Mortality also was associated, although
not significantly, with average levels of SO2
during the previous week. When SO2 levels
of both the current and previous week are
considered, the estimated RRs become 1.26
(1.01–1.57) for a 0.10-ppm increase in SO2
from the same week and 1.20 (0.96–1.50) in
SO2 from the previous week. 
Long-Term Effects on Mortality
Information extracted from this period shows
the severe air pollution episode of 5–9
December 1952 was followed by a period of
elevated pollution for 2 months and an
increase in mortality that did not decline to
normal levels for several months. In the ﬁrst 2
months after the fog, both mortality and SO2
stayed above expected levels and slowly rose.
Figure 1 depicts approximate weekly total
mortality and weekly average SO2 concentra-
tions for Greater London (5). Deaths in
Greater London in late 1952 before the
episode averaged about 1,570 per week, simi-
lar to the death rate in 1951. After the
December episode, mortality remained ele-
vated for some time. For the week ending 13
December registrations of death were roughly
2.5 times higher than the corresponding
weekly averages from 1947 to 1951.
Mortality remained almost twice that of pre-
episode levels for the next 2 weeks, and rates
did not decline to normal levels over the next
2 months. Deaths in January and February
1953 were approximately 50% higher than
expected, based on figures available for the
same months of the previous year. 
Morbidity
Insurance claims received by the Ministry of
Pensions and National Insurance for new
sickness in the working population of
London and Middlesex rose in late December
1952 (5). For the week of 3–9 December
1952, which includes the episode, claims
were 36% higher than the corresponding
weekly average for 1949–1951, resulting in
an excess 5,400 claims. The next week, claims
were 108% higher than the corresponding
1949–1951 average, with 15,000 excess
claims. The number of claims for the follow-
ing 4 weeks is similar to the corresponding
weekly averages for 1949–1951. New illnesses
increased sharply during and after the fog,
then returned to normal levels. 
Figure 2 displays weekly average SO2
concentrations and the ratio of weekly insur-
ance claims for Greater London to the corre-
sponding weekly average for 1949–1951. A
similar pattern can be seen in SO2 levels and
insurance claims for new sickness. 
Available weekly insurance data are
provided for 7-day periods from Wednesday
to Tuesday, whereas weekly SO2 averages are
provided for the 7-day periods from Sunday
to Saturday. Excess insurance claims, those
above 1949–1951 weekly levels, were ana-
lyzed with the SO2 concentrations averaged
across 3–9 days before the insurance claim
week ended. For example, excess insurance
claims from 12 November to 18 November
were paired with SO2 levels from 9
November to 15 November. The correlation
of weekly insurance claims for new illness (29
October 1952–13 January 1953) and weekly
average SO2 (26 October 1952–10 January
1953) is 0.93. If the week containing the
episode is omitted, the correlation is 0.71,
indicating a strong relationship between
illness and air pollution. 
Hospital admissions also rose during the
fog (5). Before the severe episode, hospitals in
Greater London admitted approximately 750
cases per day—about 23% for respiratory dis-
ease. For the week ending 9 December a total
of 1,100 patients were admitted—41% for
respiratory disease. Respiratory disease hospi-
tal admissions increased 163%, and total hos-
pital admissions increased 48%. Information
on admissions for the next 2 months was not
available for this analysis. 
Applications to the Emergency Bed
Service Bureau, which occurred when a
patient could not be admitted directly to a
particular hospital during and following the
episode, far exceeded those of previous years.
Weekly averages for London from 1949 to
1952 indicate that a sharp increase in
December was not typical and that applica-
tions normally peaked in early January.
However, on 9 December 1952, applications
reached 492, the highest number recorded at
that time. Weekly averages in December
1953 peaked around 2,550 applications per
week, whereas the highest weekly averages for
the December months of previous years were
approximately 1,050, 1,600, and 1,200 for
1950, 1951, and 1952, respectively (10).
Before the episode the number of appli-
cations from 1 December to 4 December
averaged 224 per day—47 were for respira-
tory disease and 15 for cardiac disease (5).
Figure 3 shows the ratio of the number of
admissions for a given 4-day period to those
for the 4 days before the episode.
During and after the fog, emergency bed
service applications increased, especially for
respiratory and cardiac diseases. Total emer-
gency bed service applications and the previ-
ous day’s SO2 concentrations have a
correlation of 0.78, whereas applications for
cardiac disease are even more strongly corre-
lated at 0.89. Applications for admission for
respiratory disease were more highly corre-
lated with the previous day’s SO2, with a cor-
relation of 0.90. Figures 4A and 4B depict
the rise in SO2 and associated rise in
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Figure 2. Concentrations and ratios of insurance claims
for new sickness in London and Middlesex to corre-
sponding weekly averages for 1949–1951.
Figure 3. Ratio of applications for emergency bed service
in Greater London to those from 1–4 December 1952.
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Figure 1. Approximate weekly mortality and SO2 concentrations for Greater London, 1952–1953.
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emergency bed applications for respiratory
and cardiac disease (5). 
Notifications, or official reports of
pneumonia cases for Greater London from 1
December to 6 December 1952 were 1.4
times the corresponding weekly average for
1947–1951 (5). The following 2 weeks they
were 2.7 and 2.4 times higher than
1947–1951 levels. Figure 5 shows SO2 con-
centrations and the ratio of notifications of
pneumonia in 1952 to the corresponding
weekly average for 1947–1951. These records
show an increase in pneumonia that roughly
follows the pattern of SO2 levels.
The morbidity evidence shows a strong
episodic effect but does not appear to show
the lingering long-term effects demonstrated
with mortality. This may be because of differ-
ences in air pollution effects on morbidity or
mortality or a lack of data on morbidity
impacts.
Potential Role of Inﬂuenza in
Accounting for Mortality in London,
January–March 1953
To clarify the potential role of influenza in
accounting for the persisting increases in res-
piratory morbidity and mortality, it is neces-
sary to consider that at the time of the lethal
fog, inﬂuenza was a nonnotiﬁable disease, so
no official records were kept of new cases.
Thus, the actual incidence and case–fatality
rate of inﬂuenza are unknown.
Incidence and mortality due to inﬂuenza
can be reconstructed from other information
available for the period. Observations from
general practice of medicine in the London
area from 1949 to 1968 indicate the overall
case–fatality rate from influenza was 0.2%.
During this period the incidence of inﬂuenza
ranged from 3 to 17%, with a mean of 8%
annually (11). The population of Greater
London at the time of this episode was
approximately 8.3 million (12). If the histori-
cal average rate of inﬂuenza did occur during
this time, namely 8%, with a case–fatality rate
of 0.2%, this would have resulted in about
1,328 influenza-related deaths for the entire
year, and even fewer for a shorter period. A
clinical trial of an influenza vaccine with
12,710 volunteers found attack rates of
inﬂuenza of 3% in the vaccinated group and
4.9% in the control group during the winter
of 1952–1953 (14). This could imply an even
lower incidence, and therefore fewer deaths,
than the estimated 1,328 influenza-related
deaths. In theory, the actual incidence and
case–fatality rate for the influenza epidemic
may have exceeded this range, but there is no
empirical evidence to suggest this was the case. 
The annual estimate of influenza deaths
of about 1,300 could not account for all the
excess deaths that took place in the months
following the London fog of 1952– 1953.
Total mortality in Greater London from
January to March 1953 exceeded the previous
year’s tally by 8,635 deaths, with the vast
majority of these deaths occurring in January
and February. Figure 6 depicts the unex-
plained deaths in Greater London using the
reconstructed estimated number of inﬂuenza
deaths. Over 7,000 noninﬂuenza deaths took
place that are not otherwise explained in the
months following the fog.
According to yearly reports by the Chief
Medical Officer on the State of the Public
Health from the Ministry of Health, no
major outbreak of influenza occurred in
England in 1952 (13), and only a relatively
mild inﬂuenza outbreak took place during the
winter of 1953 (14). Without providing any
clinical support for its reasoning, the British
Department of Health reported that 5,655
deaths from inﬂuenza occurred in the ﬁrst 3
months of 1953 (14), and another source
reported 5,647 influenza deaths during this
period (15). However, over 8,000 excess
deaths occurred in January and February
alone. The total number of deaths that
occurred during this time was more than 2
times higher than that attributed to inﬂuenza
under this undocumented scenario. This was
because over 13,000 excess deaths occurred
from December 1952 through March 1953,
when only about 5,600 inﬂuenza deaths were
ofﬁcially reported. 
Our recalculation of inﬂuenza deaths for
this period clearly shows the ofﬁcial estimates
of influenza deaths in the formal report on
this episode were inflated. However, even if
the official British Department of Health
reports of influenza deaths were accurate,
about 3,000 deaths remain unexplained by
inﬂuenza. Effectively, additional excess deaths
remain unexplained.
It is clear from the proceeding analysis not
all the excess deaths can be attributed to
inﬂuenza. On the basis of analyses of the lev-
els of air pollution that occurred and the
absence of information confirming an epi-
demic of influenza, these deaths in
January–March of 1953 may stem from high
levels of air pollution, which continued for
months following the episode. Regression
analysis found an association between weekly
average SO2 concentrations and mortality,
even when the week of the extreme episode
was excluded. For months after the fog, SO2
concentrations exceeded both pre-episode lev-
els and those from the corresponding
1951–1952 time frame, which had typical air
pollution levels. Alternatively, mortality in
months after the fog may be related to linger-
ing effects from the episode itself.
Figure 4. (A) SO2 and emergency bed service applications for respiratory disease for Greater London, 1952. (B) SO2
and emergency bed service applications for cardiac disease for Greater London, 1952.
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Figure 5. SO2 concentrations and ratios of notiﬁcations
of pneumonia in 1952 to corresponding weekly averages
for 1947–1951.
Estimated annual influenza deaths:
Influenza case fatality rate = 0.2%
Annual influenza incidence ≈ 8%
Population of Greater London = 8.3 million
Total excess deaths: 8,635 for Jan.–Mar. 1953 (deaths above
  the 1952 mortality for the same period)
This does not include the over 5,000 excess deaths
  during Dec. 1952.
Influenza deaths 1,328
Unexpected deaths
7,297
Figure 6. Excess deaths from the London smog for
January– March 1953.
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If the ofﬁcial estimates of inﬂuenza deaths
are inﬂated, as evidenced by our analyses, the
number of unexplained excess deaths from 30
November 1952 to 28 February 1953 is
about 12,000 (13,375 excess deaths minus
1,328 inﬂuenza deaths). This ﬁgure is based
on the conservative assumption that all
inﬂuenza deaths for the year occur by the end
of February. Even if the official estimates of
influenza mortality are accurate, an unex-
plained excess mortality of about 7,700
remains (13,375 excess deaths minus 5,655
inﬂuenza deaths or, using another source for
the inﬂuenza mortality, 13,375–5,647). If the
elevated death rates in the months following
the severe episode in early December are
attributable to the severe fog, the number of
excess deaths would exceed 7,000, which is
much higher than the 3,000 or so generally
reported (5,7,16).
Comparison of Estimated Levels 
of Pollution during London Lethal Fog
with Ambient Levels Recorded in Some
Countries
Air pollution levels during the London fog of
1952 greatly exceeded modern-day U.S.,
British, and European regulations and World
Health Organization guidelines (Table 3)
(17–21). SO2 concentrations were 12–23
times higher than those set by these regula-
tions and guidelines, and PM concentrations
were about 5–19 times higher. Reports from
many developing countries indicate past lev-
els in some regions have approximated those
reported in London (22). Current levels in
poorly monitored zones may also approach
these levels and have similar consequences.
Tables 3 and 4 show that air pollution levels
reported during the lethal London fog of
1952–1953 can be found in many cities
today and can range 5–20 times higher than
modern regulatory requirements (17–21). For
instance, the average annual level of total sus-
pended particulate (TSP) reported in 1995 in
Delhi was over 400 µg/m3. The annual TSP
concentrations for Beijing and Calcutta were
about 380 µg/m3 each (22). A number of
cities in China have had annual levels in
excess of 700 µg/m3 in the mid-1990s.
Current levels in some cities are lower.
However, levels measured in many develop-
ing countries in the 1990s were much higher
than the annual smoke concentration of 270
µg/m3 for Greater London in 1952 (23).
Discussion
The analyses presented here indicate that the
true scope and scale of the health effects
linked with London’s lethal smog extended
over a longer period than originally esti-
mated. The fact that respiratory deaths and
illness in January and February are more
highly correlated with average measures of
SO2 and TSM for the previous week than for
the current week suggests increased morbidity
and mortality may be driven by cumulative
exposures or by a lagged effect. This interpre-
tation of the important role of chronic expo-
sures for acute events such as death and
respiratory hospitalizations is corroborated by
recent studies ﬁnding that the RR for cardiac
emergency admissions is significantly associ-
ated with annual measures of air pollution (9).
In London, this lethal episode of pollu-
tion was associated with a rise in morbidity,
as evidenced by insurance claims for new ill-
ness, hospital admissions, applications to
emergency bed service, and notifications of
pneumonia, all of which have patterns similar
to air pollution concentrations. The episode
was also accompanied and followed by
unusually high mortality rates for a period of
2.5 months, which shows a strong correlation
with pollution levels, indicating that the fog
increased acute mortality. Long-term mortal-
ity may also have been affected, as death rates
did not return to normal levels until the end
of February. 
Although earlier analysis attributed many
of these excess deaths to a mild inﬂuenza epi-
demic, a closer look at the number of excess
deaths indicates only a fraction of them could
have been from influenza. Although the
excess deaths reported here cannot be conclu-
sively linked to air pollution, it is highly likely
the true tally of this episode is much higher
than earlier reported.
Current air pollution research suggests the
acute episode of pollution during London’s
lethal smog would have been expected to
have both immediate and chronic public
health impacts. New evidence exists on the
chronic health impacts of even lower levels of
air pollution, particularly its role for cardiac
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Table 3. Comparison of 1952 air pollution levels in London to current standards.
SO2 TSM
Pollution levels for Greater London, 5–8 December 1952
Episode average 0.57 ppm 1,400 µg/m3
Highest daily average 0.69 ppm 1,620 µg/m3
Regulatory standards and guidelines (24-hr average)
U.S. NAAQS 0.03 ppm 260 µg/m3 a
~250 µg/m3b
British environmental regulation 125 µg/m3 (0.047 ppm) ~83 µg/m3 c
WHO guidelines 125 mg/m3
European Union legislation 125 µg/m3 ~83 µg/m3 c
Ratio of Greater London 1952 levels to standards and guidelines
For episode average 
U.S. NAAQS 19 5.4–5.6
British standards 12 17
WHO guidelines 12
European Union legislation 12 17
For highest daily level 
U.S. NAAQS 23 6.2–6.5
British standards 15 19
WHO guidelines 15
European Union legislation 15 19
Abbreviations: NAAQS, National Ambient Air Quality Standards; WHO, World Health Organization.
aTSP NAAQS from 1971 to 1987. bTSP estimate based on PM10/TSP of 0.6 and current PM10 standard of 150 µg/m3. cTSP estimate
based on PM10/TSP of 0.6 and current PM10 standard of 50 µg/m3.
Table 4. Comparison of air pollution levels to current standards for selected cities.
SO2 TSP
Approximate annual pollution levels for select cities (1993–1995)
Guiyand, China 0.16 ppm –
Chongqing, China 0.13 ppm –
Delhi – 410 µg/m3
Rio de Janeiro 0.05 ppm 140 µg/m3
Moscow 0.41 ppm 100 µg/m3
Beijing 0.03 ppm 375 µg/m3
Regulatory standards and guidelines (annual)
U.S. NAAQS 80 µg/m3 (0.03 ppm) ~83 µg/m3 a
British environmental regulation – ~67 µg/m3 b
WHO guidelines 50 µg/m3 (0.02 ppm) –
European Union legislation – ~83 µg/m3 a
Highest ratio of cities’ pollution levels to standards and guidelines
U.S. NAAQS 14 4.9
British standards – 6.1
WHO guidelines 21 –
European Union legislation – 4.9
aTSP estimate based on PM10/TSP of 0.6 and current PM10 standard of 50 µg/m3. bTSP estimate based on PM10/TSP of 0.6 and current
PM10 standard of 40 µg/m3.
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disease as well as respiratory disease (9,24).
Every year an estimated 8,100 deaths occur in
urban areas of Great Britain due to PM10
(PM with a mass median aerodynamic diame-
ter less than 10 µm), and 3,500 deaths result
from SO2. Respiratory hospital admissions
are increased by 10,500 from PM10 pollution
and 3,500 for SO2 (25). 
Events as extreme as the 1952 fog are rare
in developed countries, although such levels
are likely to occur in rapidly growing regions,
where monitoring of pollution and health are
not widely conducted. In rapidly growing
midsize cities of some regions, limited moni-
toring of air pollution or public health is
available, but it is likely conditions exist
similar to those of London. 
However, air pollution is not restricted to
developing regions. From 12 December to 15
December 1991 a dense smog of high levels
of nitrogen dioxide and PM settled over
London. PM, measured as black smoke,
reached a concentration of 228 µg/m3, com-
parable to levels during the 1952 episode.
During these days mortality rates rose about
10% (26).
Air pollution in London in 1952 differs
from modern-day pollution in its severity and
pollutant mixture, primarily because of the
shift away from coal as a fuel source. Yet
reanalysis of this historic event can shed light
on the impact of air pollution on premature
death and morbidity worldwide. Even with a
limited data set and without the use of
sophisticated statistical methods, the impact
of the London killer fog on mortality is clear.
Such extreme events are indicators of what
can happen under circumstances of meteoro-
logic inversion and concentrated pollution.
In many rapidly growing midsize cities
today, the conditions of London and Donora
can arise. Although routine monitoring of
health or pollution is not conducted in some
areas, this analysis suggests the need for vigi-
lance about public health impacts linked with
air pollution in such regions. The absence of
public information on the problems of air
pollution in industrialized areas should not be
mistaken as a signal that such effects are not
occurring. Rather, opportunities abound for
reducing and controlling such pollution,
thereby improving public health and prevent-
ing tragedies such as those that occurred in
Donora and London. 
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